So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

2006 Security Breaches Matrix reveals that a large number of the data
leaks were caused due to stolen laptops, which can be easily mitigated
by using full disk encryption on the laptop. So why not encrypt the
whole drive? Cost and performance impact are the usual arguments. Tests
show that access time for files increases by 56%-85% after full disk
encryption. And the cost of FDE software usually ranges from $0-$300
depending on how good of a software and support you wanna get. So is it
NOT worth it?

Data from tests (performance impact) of the FDE products (PGP,
Compusec, Pointsec and Utimaco):
http://www.xml-dev.com/blog/index.php?action=viewtopic&id=25 0

2006 Security Breaches Matrix:
http://www.efortresses.com/refdocs/2006-Breaches-Matrix.pdf

Re: So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

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Re: So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

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Re: So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

OK, the review of the 7 Full Disk Encryption suites is now complete.
The results are at:
http://www.xml-dev.com/blog/index.php?action=viewtopic&id=25 0

I did an analysis of various FDE solutions to find the best one for my
needs. The key thing I was interested was that it must be AES 256,
reasonably fast, inexpensive, and *offer key recovery in case of
password loss*.

Compusec is great for home / personal use. It is cheap i.e. $0.00
(Free), and does not slow down the computer as much as the other
products. But that is because it only support 128 bit AES, which is a
major drawback as most enterprise settings require at least 256 bit
AES. Compusec also has a great online support forum where you can get
your questions answered by Compusec employees and other experienced
users.

I ended up purchasing both Utimaco and Pointsec. They are excellent
products. They both support AES 256. The downside is that they are
little bit expensive (Pointsec:$170 ; Utimaco:$200) and slow.

The best thing is they both offer great password / encryption key
recovery capabilities. You can create a recovery disk with both
products.

They also offer password recovery using Challenge / Response sequence,
where the IT Helpdesk can perform a Challenge/Response sequence with
the user to help them recover the password or reset it to a new one.
Off course Challenge/Response password recovery is the NOT most secure,
especially if the user is remote, but you have the option to disable it
on the laptop if you want.
..

saqib
http://www.full-disk-encryption.net

Re: So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

"Saqib Ali" writes:

>OK, the review of the 7 Full Disk Encryption suites is now complete.
>The results are at:
>http://www.xml-dev.com/blog/index.php?action=viewtopic&id=2 50

>I did an analysis of various FDE solutions to find the best one for my
>needs. The key thing I was interested was that it must be AES 256,
>reasonably fast, inexpensive, and *offer key recovery in case of
>password loss*.

Sorry, AES 256 why? It is idiotic in that finding a 128 bit key is simply
infeasible now and in the rather distant future.
And then you demand key recovery which means that you automatically make
the system weak. If you can recover the key, so can the enemy. Ie, it is
like saying "I want a 1 foot thick steel door for my home, and I want a cat
door in it, so if I forget my key I can reach in and unlock it. "

>Compusec is great for home / personal use. It is cheap i.e. $0.00
>(Free), and does not slow down the computer as much as the other
>products. But that is because it only support 128 bit AES, which is a
>major drawback as most enterprise settings require at least 256 bit

How in th eworld is that a drawback? Under what rational criteria is that a
drawback?


>AES. Compusec also has a great online support forum where you can get
>your questions answered by Compusec employees and other experienced
>users.

>I ended up purchasing both Utimaco and Pointsec. They are excellent
>products. They both support AES 256. The downside is that they are
>little bit expensive (Pointsec:$170 ; Utimaco:$200) and slow.

>The best thing is they both offer great password / encryption key
>recovery capabilities. You can create a recovery disk with both
>products.

>They also offer password recovery using Challenge / Response sequence,
>where the IT Helpdesk can perform a Challenge/Response sequence with
>the user to help them recover the password or reset it to a new one.
>Off course Challenge/Response password recovery is the NOT most secure,
>especially if the user is remote, but you have the option to disable it
>on the laptop if you want.

And now you tell me that a third party also has your key as well? Sheesh.


>.

>saqib
>http://www.full-disk-encryption.net

Re: So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

> How in th eworld is that a drawback? Under what rational criteria is that a
> drawback?

hmm, all i said that compusec was a excellent product but it only
offers 128bit AES. Most of the government agencies, and especially if
you work for financial institution, require you to use 256 AES.


> And now you tell me that a third party also has your key as well? Sheesh.

hmm. what do you mean by third party?

For the Challenge/Response password recovery to work, the IT Help Desk
needs to know a secret. If that secret is leaked (e.g. posted on a
website) yes then a attacker *might* be login into the system. The
attacker would still need another secret, the user's logon name, which
may or may not be easy to guess in 3 trys.

As I said earlier, you can turn off the challence/response password
recovery if you want. But it is good to have in case the employee
leaves the company without giving up the passwords. This may not be
applicable in all situations.

BTW, the site that was hosting the analysis was down for a short period
of time. It is back online the URL is still the same:
http://www.xml-dev.com/blog/index.php?action=viewtopic&id=25 0

saqib
http://www.full-disk-encryption.net

Re: So why don"t we use full disk encryption on all mobile devices?

"Saqib Ali" writes:

>> How in th eworld is that a drawback? Under what rational criteria is that a
>> drawback?

>hmm, all i said that compusec was a excellent product but it only
>offers 128bit AES. Most of the government agencies, and especially if
>you work for financial institution, require you to use 256 AES.

I guess I did say rational criteria. There si no rational reason to prefer
256 over 128.


>> And now you tell me that a third party also has your key as well? Sheesh.

>hmm. what do you mean by third party?

>For the Challenge/Response password recovery to work, the IT Help Desk
>needs to know a secret. If that secret is leaked (e.g. posted on a
>website) yes then a attacker *might* be login into the system. The
>attacker would still need another secret, the user's logon name, which
>may or may not be easy to guess in 3 trys.

The help desk is the third person. Anyone else who knows the password is
the third person. That introduces a huge security hole, far far larger than
any AES128/256 distinction. It reduces the security to something like the
unix crypt funtion-- seeems secure but is easily broken. In this case not
broken, but susceptible to other far more efficient lines of attack than
direct attack on the cypher.



>As I said earlier, you can turn off the challence/response password
>recovery if you want. But it is good to have in case the employee
>leaves the company without giving up the passwords. This may not be
>applicable in all situations.

I understand why you would want it. It is also a huge security hole. That
is where I would spend my security concerns, not whether it uses 128, 256
or whatever size AES.



>BTW, the site that was hosting the analysis was down for a short period
>of time. It is back online the URL is still the same:
>http://www.xml-dev.com/blog/index.php?action=viewtopic&id=2 50

>saqib
>http://www.full-disk-encryption.net

All I am saying is that the number of bits should not be factor in your
decision, unless there is some insane political reason to take it into
account. It is the least of your worries.

You also have to decide what it is you are using the encryption to protect
yourself from. If it is from the local druggie, or if it is fromNSA those
are very different situations.
The other thing you shoud chech is write speeds. If they use a stream
cypher, they have to rekey every single time you write. And they have to
reencrypt the whole block. If the block is file sized, they have to rewrite
the whole file, not just the section of the file that changed.
They also have to have a subkey management fascility.